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In the SupreiDe Court of the
State of Utah
'

\

FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK,

a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

CASE
NO. 8282

UNIVERSAL C. I. T. CREDIT CORPORATION,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE

The appellant, on its brief, has made a, preliminary
statement which we believe eontains some statements of
facts which are without support in the evidence, and some
facts are there omitted which we deem material. What is
said under paragraph 1, Wholesale, and under 2, Retail, on
pages 1 and 2 of appellant's brief may be true, but much
of what is there said is without support in the evidence.
In light of the fact that there is considerable evidence
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omitted, some of which is without confli,ct, we have deemed
it advisable to make a brief summary of the evidence rather
than to attempt to merely supplement the statements made
in appellant's brief.
(Note: Throughout this brief we shall refer rto matters found in the judgment roll by the letter R followed by
the page of the record where the same occurs, and ~we shall
refer to the evidence in the transcript of the evidence by
the letters Tr followed by the page of the transcript where
the same occurs.)
Plaintiff is and at all times here involved was a banking corporation doing business as such at Provo, Utah County, Utah. Defendant. corporation is and at all times here
involved was a corporation engaged in the business of financing retail dealers in automobiles. Harry Parsley, Inc.
is and at all times here involved was a corporation with an
agency for selling new Mercury and Lincoln automobiles
at Provo, Utah. It also dealt in buying and selling used
automobiles of various kinds. Prior to October, 1952, the
Harry Parsley, Inc. was being financed by the Commercial
Credit Corporation (Tr. 5). .A!bout October 2, 1952, the
defendant took over the financing of the Harry Parsley,
Inc. (Tr. 7). The personal defendants were at all times
here invoJved either officers or agents of the defendant corporation. The defendant Frank Nichols, whose true name
is Francis J. Nichols, was the special sales representative
of the defendant corporation (Tr. 209). The defendant W.
W. Wilkinson was, during the time involved in this controversy, the operating manager of the defendant corporation
and engaged in overseeing rthe operation of wholesale and
credits and personnel of five branches, the same being at
Seattle, Boise, Idaho Falls, Ogden and Salt Lake City (Tr.
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245). From the time the defendant corporation took over
the financing of Harry Parsley Corporation about the first
of October, 1952, to December 23, 1952, this practice of doing business was followed:
From time to time Harry Parsley, Inc. would draw a
sight draft on the defendant corporation and receive therefor immediate credit at the plaintiff bank (Tr. 4). The
sight draft was on the outside of an envelope in the following form:
"Please seal this envelope
CIT
Universal
Sight Draft
City
State
Date
195
At sight
Pay to The Order of
$ _ _ __
the sum of
ollars
To Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation
45 East 3rd South
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _........,,ealer
_________________Title
Payable through First Security Bank of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah
31-1-1240"
See plaintiff's Exhibit I.
The blanks were properly filled out by the one who
drew the sight draft. In this case by the Harry Parsley,
Inc. When the sight drafts were so drawn they were taken
to the plaintiff bank, which gave Harry Parsley, Inc. immediate credit in his account at the bank for the full amount
of the draft. Contained in the envelope upon which the
drafts were printed there was placed an invoice and contract of sale, together with a eheek made payable to the
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defendant corporation for the amount of ·the draft 'Contained
on the outside of the envelope. The invoice and contract
of sale -contained a des:eription of the automobile involved
in the transaction, the amount for which sold, the amount
of the sales tax, if any, the down payment and such other
information as was necessary to inform the drawer of the
draft the nature of the transaction. (See plaintiff's Exhibit A, B_, C, D, E, F, G, H and I.)
WhiLe neither the plaintiff bank nor the defendant corporation approved the method of the bank giving immediate
credit :for the amount of the sight drafts drawn by the Parsley corpocation, it was agreed that such practice would be
and it was followed until December 23, 1952 (Tr. 9).
On December 23, 1952, the defendant Nichols called
J. Hamilton Calder, Vice-President and ~Cashier, of the plaintiff bank on long distance telephone and asked Mr. Calder
if the bank was extending credit to the Parsley Company;
Mr. Calder stated that they were not extending any credit
to that eompany, but merely served as a depository. In
that ~conversation, Mr. Calder asked Mr. Nichols what the
record showed as to the financial standing of the Parsley
Company, and was informed by Mr. Nichols that a recent
statement submitted to the defendant company showed a
net profit of $90,000.00 and while he was somewhat overextended and short on working capital, they were of the
opinion that he was sound. Mr. Nichels further stated that
he would be in Provo at the end of the week and would call
at the bank (Tr. 10). That during October (1952) the bank
handled about $100,000.00 in business with the Parsley Cor·
poration; in November about $160,000.00; in December
about $102,000.00 and in January, 1953, about $55,000.00
(Tr. 10). This business consisted of accepting sight drafts
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drawn by the Parsley ~corporation for immediate credit, except some of the drafts drawn in January, 1953, which were
not honored by the defendant company; that there was. no
difficulty about the matter of giving immediate credit to the
Parsley corporation until January 6, 1953. The custom followed by the plaintiff bank during this period was to credit
the Parsley account with the face of the sight drafts by posting the same on the day after the sight drafts were delivered to the bank, but to make the credit for the drafts as
of the date the same were actually left with the bank (Tr.
11). That the envelopes upon which the drafts were drawn
were not opened because the bank was not authorized to
open the same (Tr. 12).
Mr. Oalder testified that on December 24, 1952, he
and Mr. Nichols had a conversation in which Mr. Nichols
wanted to know for what kind of drafts the bank had been
giving immediate ~credit; that Mr. NichoJs stated that his
company (defendant) had set a limit on the wholesale flooring or wholesale financing of used cars for Harry Parsley,
Inc. which had increased its inventory to a point where he
had exceeded their limit (Tr. 13). We quote the follorwing
from Mr. Calder's testimony:
"Mr. Nichols had said that we had presented some
$32,000.00 of wholesale financing which at that time
consisted of ·drafts which were up for payment in their
office. I informed him at that time that Parsley had a
sizeable stock of used cars and that his stock appeared
to be in pretty good condition, and that it appears as
though he would be able to work off the excess stock
in the period of some sixty days. At that time he said
they didn't want to handle any more financing of used
cars and for us not to accept any more drafts, and I
assured him that we would nort. I said 'By the way, how
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do we determine whether the draft is wholesale or retail financing?' and his reply was 'Wholesale financing
drafts are for even amounts and generally in excess of
$3000.00.' And that terminated the conversation. I
asked him how to determine whether a draft was wholesale or retail, and the reason I asked the question is
the. drafts didn't reveal on its face anything as to its
character. My understanding was in even sums of
$1000.00 Qr in round figures (Tr. 14) like $6000.00$8000.00 or $10,000.00, whereas a retail sum had a figure in every digit, dollars and cents." (Tr. 15)
It may be well at this point to direct the attention of
the Court to the testimony offered by the defendant as to
this conversation.
Defendant (Frank Nichols) Francis J. Nichols gave this
version of the conversation had with Mr. Calder on December 24, 1952:

"I told Mr. Calder that we no longer would 1handle
-·honor sight drafts covering items of wholesale financing. Mr. Calder asked me if we would continue to
handle retail as we had in the past, and I said 'Yes'.
He then asked me how he could distinguish an item of
wholesale and an item of retail, and my reply was that
normally items of wholesale would be in larger amounts
than retail. However the only way that you could actually ten whether it was wholesale or retail items was
to open the drafts. His reply to that was he didn't
know if he should. That was all."
That during that conversation no mention was made
to Mr. Calder about even amounts of $3000.00 or more (Tr.
210). That in a conversation had on December 23, 1952,
he told Mr. Calder that he felt Harry Parsley, Inc. had an
unusually heavy used car inventory and that he felt it should
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be reduced. He further told Mr. Calder that he had a recent financial statement of the Parsley -company which
showed a net earning of $90 some odd thousand dollars as
of that time (Tr. 211). Returning to a recital of Mr. Calder's testimony, he further testified that:
"On January 5 and 6, 1953-, thirteen sight drafts
drawn on the defendant corporation for the total sum
of $29,223.65 were presented to the plaintiff bank by
the Parsley corporation and credit given to the Parsley
account on January 6, 1953. These drafts were sent
to plaintiff's correspondent bank, Walker Bank and
Trust ·Company on January 7, 1953 and presented for
payment through the First Security Bank of Utah on
January 8, 1953. All of these drafts were dishonored
and payment refused. The drafts were returned to the
plaintiff bank which received the same on January 10,
1953." (Tr. 24)
Mr. Calder further testified that he assumed all of the
drafts were retail within the definition given to him by Mr.
Nichols and that when the drafts were dishonored and returned no reason was given for the same being dishonored
(Tr. 27).
Mr. Calder further testified that he had a conversation
over long distance telephone with Mr. McConnell, a clerk
in the Salt Lake office of the defendant corporation, on January 6, 1953. That Mr McConnell stated that the plaintiff
bank was not to give immediate credit thereafter to Harry
Parsley, Inc. on its drafts. That the defendant corporation
would honor drafts that were taken up to the close of business on January 6. 1953 and that thereafter they would not
honor any drafts until defendant corporation gave plaintiff
bank direct authorization; that Mr. McConnell further stated
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that the defendant corporation had about $44,000.00 of
checks of the Parsley corporation (Tr. 51). That at the
time of this .conversation Mr. Calder believed the Parsley
corporation had been given credit for the drafts, or a part
of the drafts.
Mr. Calder further testified that on ·the morning of
January 7, 1953, Mr. McConnell and Mr. Sperry ·called at
the bank and a conversation was had by them and Mr. Bird
and the witness (Tr. 52). That the conversation was had in
the directors' room of the plaintiff bank. That they first
talked aJbout the experience of Mr. Parsley of the Parsley
corporation in connection with the automobile business;
that Messrs. M·cConnell and Sperry stated that Mr. Parsley
had come highly recommended and had been successful in
the business of selling automobiles (Tr. 5·3). That the Parsley corporation had too large an inventory Which was causing it financial distress; that the defendant company would
accept all sigbt drafts that were in process of clearance,
but would not accept any other drafts signed by Harry Parsley, Inc. That Messrs. McConnell and Sperry knew that
drafts of the Parsley company were in process of ·clearance
at the time of this conversation, because the matter was
discussed (Tr. 54). Mr. Calder further testified that if it
had not been for the promise made that the drafts would
be paid, the ~checks drawn against the credit given for the
drafts would not have been paid (Tr. 56).
Mr. Calder further testified that he had a conversation
with Mr. McElhany, an officer of the defendant corporation, on January 8, 1953. On that day, Mr. McElhany pre~ent~d to the plaintiff bank for payment a large number
of checks drawn on the bank by the Parsley corporation
(Tr. 56). That when the checks were presented to the tel-
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ler he referred them to Mr. Calder. That when Mr. Calder was asked to honor the checks he toJd Mr. McElhany
that Mr. Parsley had ordered payment stopped on all checks
in excess of $300.00; that Mr. McElhany wanted to know
if he, Calder, realized the payment of some $30,000.00 in
drafts hinged on the decision of plaintiff bank as to whether
or not it would honor for cash the checks drawn by the
Parsley corporation and held by defendant corporation; that
Mr. Calder replied that he knew the situation to be critical
and he wanted the attorney for the bank to pass on the
question; that when counsel for the bank came to the bank
he informed Mr. McElhany that the bank was obligated to
follow the instructions of the Parsley corporation; that as
Mr. McElhany started to leave the bank Mr. C'alder told
him (McElhany) that he, (Calder) would try to get Mr.
Parsley to rescind the order stopping payment of cheeks if
the defendant corporation would honor the drafts that had
been credited to the account of the Parsley corporation.
That upon the conclusion of this conversation, Mr. McElhany left the plaintiff bank ·and about an hour later plaintiff bank received word by telephone from its correspondent
bank in Salt Lake City that the drafts here involved had
been dishonored and were being returned (Tr. 58-59').
Mr. Calder further testified that on January 10, 1953,
Mr. Nichols and Mr. Sperry came to the plaintiff bank and
when informed that Messrs. Bird and Calder were disappointed because the drafts were dishonored, Messrs. Nichols and Sperry stated that the drafts were returned for a
reason that they were not prepared to discuss (Tr. 59).
Messrs. Nichols and Sperry also stated that the Harry Parsley, Inc. was out of trust to the extent of $50,000.00 and
that the defendant corporation had received an assignment
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of its reserve account and a bill of sale on its used cars.
Victor J. Bird, Vice-President of the plaintiff bank,
testified that he had a conversation with Mr. McConnell
and Mr. Sperry on January 7, 1953, at the -cashier's desk
of the plaintiff bank. That Mr. Calder was ·also present.
That in such conversation. Messrs. McConnell and Sperry
assured Messrs. Calder and Bird that the drafts here involved would be honored and paid by the defendant corporation (Tr. 173). He further testified that on January 7,
1953, Mr. Wilkinson came to the bank after it was closed
and in a conversation there had, Mr. Wilkinson stated that
he noti-ced on his desk that morning a large number of drafts
and that he ordered th~ drafts to be paid (Tr. 176-177).
Mr. Bird further testified that the checks drawn against
the credit given the Parsley corporation were paid in reliance upon the promises of the officers ·and agent of the
defendant corporation that the drafts here involved would
be honored and paid (Tr. 193). Mr. Bird further testified
that the bank had up to the close of business on Jan. 7, 1953,
to dishonor and return the checks drawn by the Parsley
corporation in favor of the defendant corporation against
the credit given for the sight drafts. That except for such
promises the checks would not have been paid (Tr. 194).
Clyde B. Sperry, a witness called by the defendants,
in part testified as follows: That he was the local branch
manager of the defendant corporation at Salt Lake City
from October, 1952, to the end of January, 1953; that he
called at the plaintiff bank before noon on January 7, 1953,
at which time he had a conversation with Mr. Calder and
Mr. Bird (Tr. 225-226). That on that occasion he asked
Mr. Calder if he would be able to certify to one check payable to the defendant corporation and drawn by the Pars-
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ley corporation. That Mr. Calder said he would not certify
to the check; that upon informing Mr. ~der that there
were other checks issued to the defendant eorporation by
the Parsley corporation that were not paid, Mr. Calder stated that the plaintiff bank would not pay the same (Tr.
227). Mr. Sperry testified that the defendant coJl)oration
had purchased the four draft items 10, 11, 12 and 13 from
the Parsley corporation by giving that corporation credit
for the same on its account (Tr. 229).
On cross-examination, Mr. Sperry testified that the
four drafts that the defendant corporation purchased from
the Parsley corporation were four of the drafts that the
defendant ·corporation had refused to honor (Tr. 230).
That Mr. Wilkinson told the witness that the sight drafts
were opened by the defendant corporation on J·anuary 8th
(Tr. 231). That at the time of the conversation, the defendant corporation had a number of checks issued by the
Parsley corporation, but the check had not been held for
some time (Tr. 233). There was received in evidence five
checks marked Defendant's Exhibit No. 7. These were
checks that had been presented to the plaintiff bank and
payment refused (Tr. 238). That the Parsley corporation
was handling Lincoln and Mercury new automobiles; that
new Mercury automobiles sell at various amounts from
$2400.00 to $3200.00 or $3300.00, depending on the equipment.
Woodrow A. Wilkinson was ·called as a witness by the
defendant corporation, and in part testified as follows:
That during October, November and December of 1952,
and January of 1953, he was the operating manager of the
defendant corporation in charge of the Seattle, Boise, Idaho
Falls, Ogden and Salt Lake City branches (Tr. 245). That
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on January 7, 1953, he was at Provo and had with him a
number of checks payable to the defendant corporation that
had been returned; that he saw Mr. Bird about 4:30 on that
day (Tr. 246). That the only conversation had with Mr.
Bird was about the checks; that he saw the drafts involved
in this controversy on the morning of January 7 before he
went to Provo (Tr. 247). That he examined the sight drafts
on January 7, 1953, at the request of Mr. McElhany (Tr.
248); that he ordered the drafts returned to the bank. That
plaintiff's Exhibits A, B, C. D, E. F. G, H, and I represent
wholesale transactions (Tr. 249); that he knew in the forepart of January, 1953, that there was an arrangement by
and between the plaintiff and the defendant covporation
whereby immediate credit was to be given to the Parsley
corporation for items of retail financing, but not for wholesale finan;cing.
'f,hat the items 10, 11, 12 and 13 on plaintiff's Exhibit
J represent retail financing (Tr. 250). That the witness
returned all of .the drafts because instructed to do so by his
boss, Mr. McElhany; that the drafts were returned early
on the morning of the 8th, which was after he had been to
Provo (Tr. 251). That the plaintiff bank refu·sed to pay
the checks which the witness presented for payment on the
7th and on the next day the drafts were dishonored and returned to the plaintiff bank; that .he did not tell Mr. Bird
on the afternoon of January 7, 1953, that he had noticed
a large number of drafts amounting to $29,223 and some
odd cents on the desk of a clerk in the Salt Lake City office and that he had ordered them paid; that he knew the
drafts were there (Tr. 252); that Mr. McElhany called the
witness from Provo on January 8th; that Mr. McElhany
was at Provo with a handful of checks (Tr. 253); that part
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of the checks that Mr. McElhany had were the checks that

the witness had the day before; that Mr. McElhany had
additional checks; that the witness did not know that a large
number of checks that plaintiff corporation had paid were
paid out of the credit given for the sight drafts that were
dishonored (Tr. 254). He further testified that one cannot
tell from the draft whether it is for a wholesale or a retail
transaction; that the only way to tell would be to open the
envelope upon which the draft is printed; that it is not the
custom to open envelopes containing drafts (Tr. 255).
G. H. McElhany was called as a witness by the defendants, and in part testified as follows: That he resides at
Seattle, Washington, and is a vice-president of defendant
corporation; that during the years 19'52 and 1953 he was
supervisor and solicitor of business; that he supervised the
handling of credit (Tr. 256); that he ~came to Provo on January 8, 1953, where he met Mr. Calder; that he had with
him a number of checks which he presented to the teller
of the plaintiff bank; that the bank refused to pay the
checks because of insufficient funds (Tr. 257); that the total
amount of the checks was $22,000.00 or $23,000.00. When
the checks were presented Mr. Calder stated that there
were not sufficient funds to pay the same and that the bank
could not pay any of the checks because payment had been
stopped on all checks in excess of $300.00 (Tr. 258) . That
Mr. Calder wanted to call his attorney, Mr. Morgan, and
the witness stepped out of the bank with Mr. Nichols and
called Mr. Wilkinson at the office of defendant corporation
in Salt Lake City (Tr. 259); that Mr. Wilkinson stated that
some of the drafts that the defendant ~corporation held were
wholesale and some were retail (Tr. 260); that the witness
told Mr. Wilkinson to refuse payment on all of the drafts;·
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that after the telephone conversation with Mr. Wilkinson the
witness went back in the plaintiff bank; that he told Mr.
Calder "that it was time we took a long look at that entire
matter, and that I would stop payment on these drafts;
that they all could be paid at a later date, but they were
being stopped now and returned. In fact they can be paid
now." (Tr. 262)
On cross-examination he testified "that he was nervous
about it, yes. Mr. Wilkinson told me that there was checks
to be returned and I had a handful of checks about $23,000.00 worth, yes, several thousand dollars worth and the bank
would not cash the checks"; that "I believe as I recall, it
was two years ago, I told him I was going to stop payment
on the drafts"; that after he had stopped payment on those
drafts he came back to the :bank and urged the bank to pay
the checks he had (Tr. 263). That he told Mr. Calder he
was going to stop payment on the drafts; that he knew at
that ti~me there were drafts in the office at Salt Lake, but
did not know that the bank had given the Parsley corporation credit for the same; that he knew the sight drafts
at Salt Lake City amounted to about $29,000.00 because
Wilkinson told him (Tr. 264); that he knew the drafts were
not paid by defendant corporation; that the defendant corporation was holding $22,000.00 or $23,000.00 in checks of
. the Parsley -corporation (Tr. 265) ; that he knew that arrangements had been made for retail and not wholesale
financing in connection with the Parsley corporation (Tr.
266).
These facts are establi·shed without any dispute:
The plaintiff on January 6, 1953, received 13 sight
drafts drawn by the Parsley corporation on the defendant
corporation. These drafts were credited to the account of
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the Parsley corporation as of Janaury 6, 1953, although the
actual posting off the credit was not made until January
7th. The total amount of the sight drafts for whieh the
Parsley eoDporation was given immediate credit was $29,223.65 (Tr. 16). It was so found by the trial court (R. 67).
No attack is made upon such finding. That during the latter part of December, 1952, and the forepart of January,
1953, Harry Parsley, Inc. drew a large number of checks
in the total sum of in excess of $30,000.00, which checks
were drawn on the plaintiff in favor of the defendant corporation (Tr. 264), and Plaintiff's Exhibits X, CC, EE, FF,
GG, DD, AA, Z, Y ·and 'Defendant's Exhibits 6 and 7. It
was so found by the trial court, and no attack is made upon
such finding (R. 67).
That in addition to the immediate credit given to the
Parsley ·corporation for the sum of $29,223.65, for the sight
drafts drawn on the defendant corporation, the Parsley eorporation had other credits in its account in the sum of $7,792.57 which offset against the $29,223.65, making a balance of $21~431.08 in checks that were drawn by the Parsley corporation in favor of the defendant corporation and
paid to rthe defendant corporation out of the credit given
to the Parsley corporation for the sight drafts that were
dishonored and returned to the plaintiff (Tr. 34). The trial
court so found. (See Finding No. 17, R. 70)
Neither the plaintiff nor its agents opened the envelopes upon which the sight drafts were written at or prior
to the time they were mailed to the plaintiff's correspondent
bank at Salt Lake City to be presented to defendant corporation for payment (Tr. 12 and 219). There is a conflict
in the evidence as to whether or not the envelopes containing the drafts were opened by the defendant corporation
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before they were returned to the plaintiff, or whethe·r the
envelopes were first opened after they were returned to the
plaintiff (Tr. 19 and 247).
·
That the District Court Rules of the Fourth Judicial
Distri·ct Court of Utah County for Setting of Cases for Trial
which were in effect at the times here involved contain,
among others, the following provisions:
"6. Civil causes and contested probate causes at
issue will be set for trial only upon writen demand of
counsel for one of the parties filed with the clerk of the

court.
"The demand for setting of a cause for trial shall,
in addition to such demand, contain the names and addresses of all counsel of record in the cause, and aver
that a copy of such demand has been mailed by demanding counsel to counsel for each of the parties who
have appeared in the cause, and shall state whether the
cause is to be tried by jury or to the court, and shall
contain a blank to be filled in by the court stating the
date and hour of the trial. The transmission of such
copies shall constitute notice to all counsel of the sending of the demand for trial setting, and the court shall
allow sufficient time after date of demand to permit
counsel to communicate their preference and recommendation to the court.
Jury fees may be paid at the time of filing
the demand for setting, but must be paid within five

"8.

days after the date of making such demand."
(See ·certified copy of District Court Rules for Assignment and Setting of Cases for Trial filed herein; also Demand for Trial Certificate & Order (R. 52) and Notice of
Trial (R. 53)). It will be noted that the Demand for Trial
is dated April 29, 1954, Which was filed by the Clerk on Ap-
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ril 30, 1954 (R. 52). Notice of Trial was given on May 7,
1954 (Tr. 53). The Demand for a Jury is dated June 26,
1954, and was filed on June 28, 1954 (R. 57). On January
12, 1953, the Harry Parsley corporation executed and delivered to tJhe plaintiff a Note together with a Chattel Mortgage on its equipment, machinery, parts, stock in trade,
furniture, fixtures and personal property at 1150 North
5th West Street in Provo, Utah (R. 33-38). It also assigned
to the plaintiff its accounts receivable (Tr. 62). Mr. Calder
testified that the mortgage was taken hy the plaintiff to
prevent a dissipation of the assets of the Parsley corporation and to protect the bank in the event the bank had difficulty in collecting the drafts or eventual payment of the
drafts (Tr. 62). The trial court so found (R. 70). A:t the
time of the execution of the above mentioned instruments,
the plaintiff returned to the Parsley co:vporation four drafts
and contracts in the total sum orf $3554.27 (Tr. 20). It was
so found by the trial court, and such finding is not attacked
(R. 70). These four drafts and contracts were for the sale
of automobiles by the Parsley corporation to individual purchasers. Defendant characterizes these items as retail
(Tr. 250). The Parsley rcorparation conveyed the four eontracts to the defendant corporation, which gave the Parsley corporation credit on its account for the same (Tr. 250
and 255-6).

A short time after the transactions above mentioned
were had the defendant corporation and others. threw the
Parsley corporation inrto involuntary bankruptcy. It is so
alleged in the Amended Complaint (R. 18) and admitted in
the defendant's answer (R. 21) and also in the brief of the
defendants filed herein, on page 4 thereof.
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While we !:lave not attempted to include all of the evidence offered and received at the trial in the foregoing summary, we believe that the evidence heretofore summarized
is all that need be considered in reaching a proper conclusion as to the judgment that should be rendered.
It will be noted that the appellant corporation has discussed its claim why the judgment appealed from should
be reversed under seven headings or poh1ts, together with
its conclusions under Point 8. We shall discuss the Points
relied upon in the order set out in appellant's brief, and then
diseuss the Point which respondent raises in its cross-appeal.
While we believe there is ample evidence to support a
judgment against the personal defendants because of fraud
perpetrated upon the plaintiff as alleged in the Amended
Complaint, we shall not urge that the trial court erred in
such particular because this being an action at law, we entertain some doubt as to whether or not plaintiff is entitled
to such relief. The plaintiff, however, does claim that the
trial court was in error as a matter of law in refusing to
grant the plaintiff judgment against the defendant corporation for the full amount of its claim. By its cross-appeal,
plaintiff contends:
POINT ONE A
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING THAT
PAJRT O·F ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 WHERE
IT CONCLUDED THAT THE AMOUNT OF THE FOUR
DRAFTS IN THE SUM OF $3554.27 SHOULD BE DEDUC·TED FROM THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT
TO WHICH THlE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED AND IN
FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
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PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT CO~R
PORATIO·N FOR THE SUM OF $21,431.08, TOGETHER
WITHl INTEREST THEREON AT THE RATE O·F 6%
PER ANNUM FROM AND AFTER JANUARY 8, 1953.
POrNT ONE
THE APPELLANT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO A
TRIAL BY JURY.
Arti·cle I, Sec. 10, of the Constitution of Utah, in part,
provides:
"A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.''

Rule 38(d), Utah Ruies of Civil Procedure, provides
that:
"the failure to demand a trial by jury in conformity
with Rule 38 constitutes a waiver of the right to a trial
by jury."
It will be noted that the defendants failed to make a
demand for a jury trial as required by the rules of the Distriet Court of Utah County, a certified copy of whieh is filed
herein, and therefore a jury trial was waived.
In passing upon the effect of the above provision of the
Constitution, this Court held in the case of Salt Lake City

v. West, 55 Utah 357, 186 Pac. 114, that where an application for a jury trial was not timely filed, and no excuses
were alleged or shown explaining such failure, there was
no abuse of discretion on the part of the Court in denying
the belated request. To the same effect see Nichols v Cheny, 22 Ut. 1, 60 Pac. 1103; Gibson v. MeGWTin, 37 Ut. 158;
106 Pac. 669; Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Ut. 331; 153 Pac.
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(2d) 665, 667. So also is it the established law in rthis· jurisdiction that where the facts undisputably establish no right
to relief, the reversal by the Supreme Court of a judgment
entered on a verdict in f.avor of the ·plaintiff does not deprive the plaintiff of his constitutionally guaranteed right
to a trial by jury. Creamer v. Ogden Union Railway and
Depot Co.,
.Utah
, 242 Pac. (2d) 575.

Not only did the defendants fail to make a timely demand for a jury trial, but as we shall presently point out,
the undisputed facts in this case entitled the plaintiff to a
judgment as a matter of law, for the amount prayed for by
it, and therefore, under the doctrine of Creamer v. Ogden
Union Railway and Deport Company, the defendants may
not be heard to eomplain because they were denied a jury
trial.
POINT TWO
THE OON~ACTS HERE SUED UPON ARE NOT
WHOLESALE CONTR.A!CTS WITHIN THE DEFINITION
OF SUCH CONTRACTS GIVEN BY FRAN1CIS J. NICHOLS AC·CO'RDING TO THE TESTIMONY OF J. HAMILTON CALDER (TR. 14) AND THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT (R. 66) AND EVEN IF THEY WERE
WHOLESALE C0 NTRACTS, THE DEFENDANT CORPORATIO·N HAS NO CAUS·E FOR COMPLAINT BEC.A!USE IT WILL SUFFER NO DAMAGE IF IT REIMBURSES THE PLAINTIFF THE MONEY TO WHICH IT
IS NOT ENTITLED.
1

It is asserted in defendant's brief that without the possibility of a doubt, the transactions represented by items
marked Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, Hand I are wholesale
items. It is true that a number of defendants' witnesses
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so testified. However, an examination of the authorities
defining what is a wholesale and what is a retail transaction is not so easy of solution as eounsel would have the
Court believe.
It will be noted that each of the above enumerated
transactions involve but one automobile. It is apparently
the contention of counsel for defendant that a wholesale
transaction does not provide for a sales tax (Tr. 91). It
will be seen that the invoice contained in the transaction I,
the largest transaction involved in this controversy, provides for a sales tax of $3.50.
Apparently the transaction represented by Exhibit F
was for an automobile to be used as a demonstrator. That
is also true of the transaction represented by E~hi:bit E, D,
B, C, F, and A. It is difficult to tell from Exhibit G just
what was to be done with that automobile. There appears
a statement contained in that envelope "As We Paid it Off."
The meaning of the word wholesale, wholesale sales is
discussed at length in Vol. 45, pages 107 to 116, of the permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, where numerous
cases are cited. We cite only a few of such cases:
"The primary and usual meaning of the word
wholesale is the sale of goods in gross to retailers who
sell to consumers. State v. Spencer, 53 So. 596; 597;
127 La 336. The term wholesale is the selling by unbroken parcels as distinguished from retail or dividing
into smaller quantities and selling direct to consumers.
Cont'l Banking Co. v. Campbell, 53 Pac. (2d) 114, 116;
176 Okla 218. The sale of liquors from time to time in
six or ten gallon kegs of different kinds cannot be called
selling by wholesale. Gossult v. Gutterfield, 2 Wise.
237; 242. Where tangible personalty is sold fior purchaser's use or ~consumption and not for resale in sub-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
stantially the same condition as purchased, there is a
retail sale within the terms of Retail Sales ':Vax Act,
rather than a wholesale sale and aside from specific
statutory exceptions or exemptions, the real test is existence of sale to one who uses or consumes the property irrespective of whether property is used in purchaser's place of business or in his home. Warren v.
Funk, 72 Pac (2d) 968; 146 Kan. 716."
If the doctrine announced by the Kansas court in the
case lqst above cited is to be followed, the fact that an automobile was to be used by salesmen for purposes of demonstration would not make it a wholesale deal, as distinguished
from a retail deal, quite the contrary. So also the fact that
Mr. Parsley should personally purchase an automobile from
the defendant corporation would doubtless no:t make such
transaction a wholesale deal.
Burt if it should be construed that Exhibits A to I, both
inclusive, represent wholesale items, such fact under the
evidence and the facts as found by the trial court would
not aid the defendant corporation. Counsel for appellant
seems to contend that if Mr. Calder was informed on December 24, 1952, that the bank should not give the Parsley corporation any more immediate credit for drafts drawn after
that, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Even if such
be the fact there is ample evidence to show that such instruction was later rescinded, and all of the sight drafts
here involved would be or had been honored and would be
.Paid by the defendant corporation. Not only that, but there
is ample evidence, and the trial ,court found that in reliance
upon such promises the plaintiff paid checks in the amount
of $21,431.08 out of the credit given the Parsley corporation for the drafts that the defendant corporation refused
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to honor (R. 68 and 69, paragraphs 11 to 14, both inclusive).
The attention of the Court is again called to the testimony of Mr. Calder (Tr. 51) and Mr. Bird (Tr. 173-193).
In this eonnection it is significant that defendant Wilkinson, who was then overseeing the ·credits and personnel of
the defendant corporation's business at Salt Lake and elsewhere, according to his own testimony, came to Provo on
January 7, 1953, and presented some checks to the plaintiff
bank at Provo, which checks were not paid (Tr. 246) and
then on the next day, January 8, 1953, Mr. McElhany, a
vice-president of the defendant corporation with headquarters at Seattle, Washington, flew down to Urtah and showed
up at the plaintiff bank at Provo wirth 22 or 23 thousand
dollars in checks drawn by the Parsley corporation in favor
of the defendant corporation on the plaintiff bank and demanded payment of such checks (Tr. 256-258). When payment was refused, according to his own testimony, McElhany left the bank and talked to Mr. Wilkinson (who had
returned to Salt Lake) and told Mr. Wilkinson to refuse
payment of all of the drafts here involved (Tr. 260), notwithstanding defendants admit that four of said drafts were
retail drafts. Mter this conversation, Mr. McElhany returned to the bank and again sought to have the plaintiff
pay the checks which he then had (Tr. 263). Such actions
on the part of the officers and agents of defendant corpo-ration cannort well be said to be consistent with fair dealing.
It tends in no small degree to bear out the testimony of
Messrs. Calder and Bird that the officers and agents who
participated in the transactions here involved and brought
in question were out to get the plaintiff to pay the checks
held by it out of the credit which the bank had given to the
Parsley corporation for the drafts that were dishonored by
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the, defendant corporation. The scheme worked to the extent thq.t the defendant succeeded in disposing of, at their
face value, $21,431.08 of checks that were probably worthless or nearly so. It is plaintiff's contention that when the
officers of the defendant corporation assured the plaintiff
that if it would pay such checks, the drafts would be paid,
and if in reliance upon such promises the checks were paid,
the fa:ct that some of the checks may be characterized as
wholesale drafts does not relieve the defendant corporation
from the obUgation, even though there were, contrary to our
contention, instructions on December 24, 1952, that immediate credit should not have been given for some of the drafts.
There is no valid reason why the agreement had in January, 1953, is not binding on the defendant corporation merely because another or different arrangement may have been
had in December, 1952.
On page 9, under Point II of appellant's brief, it is said
that the trial court permitted respondent to be paid twice
for the four drafts, and that appellant is being compelled
to pay twice for such drafts. We are unable to follow such
argument. ':Dhe fact of the matter is that the amount of
the four drafts was deducted from the $21,431.08 that plaintiff was damaged because it was tricked into paying that
amount of checks out of a credit that had been given to the
Parsley ·corpor.ation on account of the drafts which defendant corporation, contrary to its promises, repudiated. We
shall have more to say about this phase of the case in conne,ctio~ with respondent's cross-appeal.
It is also said on page 9 of appellants' brief that respondent relinquished four of the dmfts to the Parsley corporation against the positive recommendation and desire of
app~Hant. If the appellant did not wish the drafts released
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to the Parsley corporation, there was one and only one way
to prevent such release, namely, to pay the drafts as they
agreed. We know of no rule of law, and we think none can
be found, that under the facts disclosed by this record the
plaintiff was required to follow the recommendation or desires of the appellant. It is also said that appellant paid
Parsley in full for the four drafts that were returned to
him. Doubtless the Parsley corporation had a right to sell
and the appellant the right to purchase said drafts. They
carried with them a contract for the sale of automobiles,
and if defendant -corporation parted with ·cash for the contracts represented by the drafts, doubtless the defendant
corporation deemed the contracts more valuable than the
cash or it would not have purchased the same. If perchance
the purchasers of the automobile for which the contract
and accompanying draft were given fails to pay the amount
that they agreed to pay, it would seem obvious that the
plaintiff is not to be penalized on account of such failure.
POINT THREE
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM AS TO THE DEFINITI0 N
OF WHAT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS WHOLESALE
AND WHAT RETAIL TRANSACTIONS IS SUPPO·RTED
BY CREDITABLE EVIDENCE.
1

,Under Point Three of appellants' brief, much is said
about what the writer of the brief claims rto be the frailty
of the testimony of plaintiff's witness, J. Hamilton Calder.
At the outset it should be kept in mind that this is an action
at law, and therefore this Court is, by the State Constitution, Sec. 9 of Article 8, and by numerous decisions, precluded from passing on the weight of the evidence. We
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have heretofore in this brief given a summary of the testimony of Mr. Calder and Mr. Bird, and no useful purpose
will be served by again going over such testimony. Suffice
it to say that such evidence is not only substantial, but, we
submit, bespeaks verity. It is true rthat the evidence shows
that Mr. ·Calder has all of the qualifications enumerated on
page 10 of appellants' brief, and that the evidence shows
that Mr. Nichols is not without experience in financial matters. Nor do we contend that there is not ample evidence
to justify the conclusion that geneTally one cannot determine without more examination of the drafts involved in
this controversy whether the same represents a retail or a
wholesale transaction. As we have heTetofore pointed out,
it is doubtful whether an examination of the contents of the
envelopes upon whi~ch the drafts were written would reveal
with any degree of certainty whether the transactions represented by the drafts were wholesale or retail. A reading
of the authorities heretofore cited shows that the courts of
last resort are not agreed as to what is and what is not a
whoJesale transaction. We venture the prediction that if
the average man in the street were asked the question of
whether the sale of one automobile such as those represented by the various transactions here involved constituted
a wholesale or a retail transaction, he would unhesitatingly
say· it was a retail transaction.
On page 18 of appellants' brief, we find a discourse
about the kiting of checks and a statement that the plaintiff was under a duty to inform defendant corporation of
the kiting of checks. We are not cited to any case holding
that any such duty existed, and in the absence of any agreement to that effect, we doubt that any such case can be
found. No one connected with the defendant corporation
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ever requested the plaintiff to keep the defendant corporation informed as to the financial ·condition of the Parsley
corporation (Tr. 122). Moreover, it is the duty of a bank
rmd, so far as we are advised, the uniform practice of banks
and bankers to refrain from informing others of the business of their customers. Indeed, if a bank or banker should
volunteer such information and it should prove false, the
bank or banker may well be required to respond in damages
in so doing. Further as to that, the evidence shows that
Mr. Parsley gave to Mr. Calder a satisfactory explanation
of the check kiting incident, and when he was asked as to
the explanation counsel for the defendants objected to such
explanation, and the objection was sustained (Tr. 131).
Appellants seem to get some comfort out of the fact
that the Parsley corporation had at times only a small
amount in its account. Just what is ·claimed for such fact
is not made to appear. Attention is also called to appellants' Exhibit Q, and the statement is made, contrary to
all of the evidence, that such exhibit shows almost continuous overdrafts in large amounts. The statement, when
viewed in the light of Mr. Calder's testimony, shows that
immediate ·credit was given to the Parsley ·covporation for
sight drafts drawn on the defendant covporation. Such
practice was admittedly done pursuant to an agreement with
the defendant corporation. What counsel for defendant
characterizes as an overdraft was not such, but conSisted
of ·checks drawn against an account which contained credits
for dmfts or other items whi·ch were deposited to the Parsley account, but had not yet cleared. That is to say, credit
had not been given the plaintiff (Tr. 137). Mr. Calder testified that the bank had never paid any overdraft of the
Parsley corporation unless it be said that to give credit for
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an nncollected draft or check constituted an overdraft (Tr.
139-140).
Again on page 19 of appellants' brief, attention is called
to the fact that Calder owned a one-half interest in a building that was being leased by the Parsley -corporation. Here
again we are at a loss to know just what such fact has to
do with this litigation. Obviously the defendant corporation
may nort be relieved from performing its undertakings with
the plaintiff because its cashier- ·was interested in a lease
of property to the Parsley -corporation.
On pages 20 to 23 of appellants' brief, counsel for appellants again reverts to the matter of wholesale and retail
drafts, among other things ·claiming that Calder is not worthy of belief because he was unable to accurately read the
photostatic cop,ies of some of the sight drafts here involved.
We suggest that the members of the Court attempt to read
such· photostatic copies and see if they can do a better job
than did Mr. ~Calder. The faot that one may not have perfect eyesight cannot well be said to affect his credibility
about matters where eyesight is not involved. It will be
noted that later in the trial, plaintiff was able to get the
original checks from which the photostatic copies were taken. Such original checks were received in evidence, and
probably no one will find any difficulty in reading such
checks. No complaint is made that the Findings of Fact
fail to reflect the correet amount of the checks drawn by
the Parsley corporation in favor of the defendant corporation and paid out of the ~credit given Parsley for the sight
drafts that defendant corporation refused to pay.
If the plaintiff or its officers should have opened the
envelopes containing the sight draft-s, such act would have
been contrary to the implied if· not expressed direction on
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the envelope, namely, the language "Please seal this envelope". In the conversation had with Mr. Nichols on December 24, 1952, according to his testimony, Mr. Calder
asked how he eould distinguish "an item of wholesale and
an item of retail and my reply was that normally items of
wholesale would be in larger amounts than retail. However the only way that you could actually ten whether it
was wholesale or retail was to open the drraft", to which
Mr. Calder replied that he didn't know if he should. Mr.
Wilkinson testified that it was not the .custom of bankers
to open envelopes upon which drafts were written (Tr. 255).
We have probably devoted more space than necessary
in answer to appellants' Point 3- because in our view the
matters there urged by appellants are ·more or less academic. In our view, it is not of -controlling importan-ce
whether the drafts here involved were wholesale or retail,
or whether the bank officials should or should not have
opened the envelopes upon which the drafts -were written.
Suppose the employees of the bank had opened the envelopes upon which the drafts were written and concluded
that the drafts represented a wholesale transaction and
therefore the Parsley corporation should not be and was not
given credit therefor. Obviously, the result would have
been that the bank would not have paid the checks in the
sum of $21,431.08, and the defendant corporation would be
holding that amount of worthless ·checks instead of being
obligated to repay to the plaintiff that amount on account
of such checks having been mistakenly paid. If the defendant ·corporation pays to the plaintiff the sum of $21,431.08,
it will be in the same position financially that it would have
been in if payment of such checks had been refused. Moreover, if as the ~court found in its Findings 11, 12, 13 and 14,
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the defendant corporation, acting through its agent and
officers assured the plaintiff that the sight drafts here involved would be or had been ordered paid, and in reliance
upon such assurance the .plaintiff paid the checks of the
P'arsley corporation in the amount of $21,431.08, what possible difference ·could it make whether the drafts for which
credit was given were wholesale or retail? Unless the appellants can successfully defeat Findings Nos. 11, 12, 13 and
14 of the trial eourt, the matter of the kind of drafts is of
no avail. The original agreement to honor all sight drafts
drawn by the Parsley corporation, prior to December 24·,
1952., is not questioned. According to plaintiff's evidence,
the same kind of an arrangement was had with respect to
the drafts here involved immediately before the bank paid
the checks which were drawn against the credit given to
the Parsley corporation for the sight drafts which were dishonored.
POINT FOUR
THE AGREEMENTS TO HONO·R WHOLESALE
DRAFTS AFTER DECEMBER 24, 1952, ARE NOT WITHIN THIE STATUTE' OF FRAUD'S.
. Under this point, ~cotmsel for appellants directs the
attention of the Court to Defendant's Exhibit 4, a memorandum of Mr. Calder, and particularly to the ·language of
paragraph 5, wherein it is recited that "On January 7 Mr.
McConnell and Mr. Sperry -called at the bank regarding
-checks they were ho~ding on Harry Parsley, Inc. They assured us that they would accept retail draf·ts in process of
clearance, but would pay no further drafts signed by Mr.
Parsley." They fail to mention the following language of
that Exhibit: "On January 7th Mr. Wilkinson, regional

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
auditor for Universal C. I. T., talked to Mr. Bird about Harry
Parsley drafts accepted by us for immediate credit. He
said he had noticed a large number of drafts totalling $29·,223.65 in Salt Lake City offices and that he had authorized
them paid." These were the drafts on which Universal C.
I. T. subsequently refused payment. It should be noted that
Mr. Sperry and Mr. McConnell called at the bank on January 7th about 10:00 o'clock A. M. (Tr. 226-173). They
did not know the nature of the drafts here involved (Tr.
216-218-230). They said the drafts would be paid (Tr. 181).
Mr. Wilkinson eame to the plaintiff bank at Provo after
closing hours, that is about 4:30 o'elock P. M. (Tr. 246-176).
Mr. Bird testified that Mr. Sperry and Mr. Nichols stated
that the drafts in question would be paid, and that Mr. Wilkinson, when he eame in after banking hours on January
7, 1953, stated that he had noticed a number of drafts in
his office on the morning of January 7, 1953, and had ordered the same paid. That these were the drafts here involved (Tr. 176-177). At that time the plaintiff could have
refused payment of the checks drawn against the drafts
(Tr. 193). Under Point Four appellants further contend
that any arrangement had after December 24, 1952, with
respeet to the payment of drafts was void under the pro•
visions of U. C. A. 1953, 25-5-4, subdivision 2 thereof. It
is there provided:
"In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged ~therewith:
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another."
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Such provision of the statute has no application to the
facts in this case ~beoause (1) The promise here sued upon
is the agreement had with the defendant corporation; (2)
The agreement sued upon has been performed by the plaintiff, and hence the statute relied upon has no application.
The contract alleged and established by the evidence
was between the plaintiff and defendant corporation. It
was in no sense cotlateral to any agreement between the
bank and the Parsley ·corporation. There is no evidence
which even remotely justifies the conclusion that the defendant corporation would pay the sight drafts if the Parsley corporation failed or refused to do so. The law in such
particular is illustrated by such eases as Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57; 6 S. W. (2d) 576; 67 A.L.R. 489. The
question of when a promise is within and when without the
Statute of Frauds is discussed at some length in 49 Am. Jur.
416 et seq and cases cited in foot notes. So also 37 C.J.S.
521, Sec. 14 and oases cited in foot notes. The Court will
doubtless not Wish to read all of the eases there cited.
Among the cases which illustrate the rule are Kelly v.
Greenough, 9 Was·h. 659; 38 Pac. 158, where it is held that
where defendant authorized B to draw certain orders which
he agreed to pay and after such orders were drawn told
plaintiff that if they would purchase then he would afterwards accept and pay them and plaintiff purchased some
of such orders, defendant cannot successfully set up the
statute of frauds. To the same effect is Nelson v. First National Bank of Chicago, 48 Ill. 36; Landsdale v. Lafayette
Bank, 18 Ohio 213; Bessell v. Lewis, 4 Mieh. 450. We have
found no case where a different doctrine has ~been announced.
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It is the established law in this jurisdi-ction that when
a contract which is within the statute of frauds has been
fully executed, the statute of frauds has no application.
Kerr v. Hillyard, 51 ,Ut. 364; 170 Pac. 981; Greenwood v.
Jackson, 102 Ut. 161; 128 Pac. (2d) 282; Bamberger Co. v.
Certified Production Inc., 88 Ut. 194; 201; 48 Pac. (2d) 489.
Utah has a statute, U.C.A. 1953, 25-5-6, whieh pro¥ides that:
"A promise to answer for the obligation of another
in any of the following cases is deemed an original obligation of the promisor and need not be in writing:
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or enters
into an obligation in consideration of the obligation in
respect to whi-ch the promise is made in terms or under
circumstances such as to render the party making the
promise the principal debtor and the person in whose
behalf it is made his surety."
In this case the plaintiff has fully performed its obligation, namely, has given the defendant immediate credit
for the sight drafts and has paid checks to the extent of
$21,431.08.
Independent of statute, it is the well established law as
stated in 49 Am. Jur. 725, Section 421, that:
"The true basis of the doctrine of part performance according to the overwhelming weight of authority, is that it would be a fraud upon the plaintiff if the
defendant were permitted to escape performance of
his part of the oral agreement after he has permitted
the plaintiff to perform in reliance upon the agreement.
The oral contract is enforced in harmony with the principle that courts of equity will not allow the statute of
frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud. In other
words, the doctrine of part performance was established for the same purpose for which the statute of
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frauds itself was enacted, namely, for the prevention
of fraud, and arose from the necessity of preventing
the statute from becoming an agent of fraud, for it
could not have been the intention of the statute to enable any party to commit a fraud with impunity."
Numerous cases from state and federal courts will be
found in foot notes in support of and which do support the
text, among whi:ch is the case of Price v. lloyd, 31 Utah
86; Other Uta:h cases where the above doctrine is applied
are: Brinton v. VanCott, 8 Ut. 480; 33 Pac. 218; Lynch v.
Coviglio, 17 Ut. 106; 53 Pac. 983; Van Natta v. Heywood,
57 Ut. 376; 195 Pa:c. 192.
Applying the doctrine of the. foregoing authorities to
the case at hand, it is apparent that the plaintiff will sustain a loss of $21,413.08 if the defendant corpoTation is· relieved from performing its part of the contract here brought
in question unless perchance the plaintiff can recover some
part thereof from the insolvent Parsley corporation.
But suppose the contract is void, such fact would not,
under the authorities, enable the defendant .-corporation to
retain the fruits of such contract and escape its burdens.
If a contract is void, it is void for all purposes. Such a socalled contract may not be said to be valid for the purpose
of enabling one party to retain the benefits thereof at the
expense of the other party thereto. The authorities, as we
read them, are all to that effect, where as here the party
invoking the statute of frauds seeks to retain the benefitS
which are a loss by the other party to the transaction. The
doctrine is illustrated by oral contracts for the sale of real
estate. The law is thus stated in 49 Am. Jur. 872, Sec. 566:
"It is well established that where a vendee enters
on premises under an oral contract for the purchase
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of such premises and the vendor thereafter repudiates
the eontraot and refuses to convey the land, asserting
the bar of the statute of frauds, the vendee is entitled
to recover, in addition to the purchase money paid by
him, the value of the i~mprovements made by him on
the premises while in possession under the parol eontract, to the ,extent, at least, that they have enhanced
the value of the land.''
So here the defendant corporation having secured the
payment of the Parsley corporation checks out of the immediate credit given that corporation by the plaintiff for
the repudiated sight drafts, may not retain the benefits of
such a transaction under the claim that the agreement by
which such a benefit was conferred upon the defendant corporation was void because not in writing.
POiNT FIVE
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE
AMOUNT OF CHECKS THAT WERE PAID BECAUSE
OF A MISTAKE OF FACT, IF THERE WERE SUCH A
MISTAKE.

Under appellants' Point Five, it is argu~ that the
plaintiff is not only chargeable with knowledge of whether
the sight drafts contained on the outside of the envelopes
were for retail or wholesale transactions, but also with the
knowledge of all of the contents of such envelopes. As we
understand appellants' position, it is that in no event may
the plaintiff ibe eX!cused for the mistake of its officers and
employees, and the defendant corporation is entitled to enrich itself to the extent of $21,413.08, because the plaintiff or its officers .made a mistake of fact. . The authorities,
as we read them, do not support any such doctrine, but are
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contrary thereto. On page 30 of appellants' brief, a number
of cases and authorities are cited which it is claimed support appellants' contention. We shall not undertake toreview in detail the eases and authorities there cited, but if
and when the Court examines the same, we believe it will
find no difficulty in concluding that they do not apply to
the facts in this ease. On page 29 of appellants' brief there
is a quotation from Williston on Contracts and from Michie,
Banks and Banking, to the effect that if a bank on which a
check is drawn pays the same by mistake, it may not be
heard to say that there were not sufficient funds with which
to pay the same. No such a situation is here presented.
In this ease the evidence shows, and the court found, that
there were sufficient credits in the account of the Parsley
corporation to pay the checks that were paid. The sole
cause of the difficulty in which plaintiff finds itself is in the
fact that the defendant corporation refused to pay the sight
drafts in violation of its assurance that the sight drafts had
been or would be paid if the plaintiff would pay the checks
which had theretofore been presented for payment.
To the same effect is the law stated in 7 Am. Jur. 443,
9 C.J.S. 772; 2 Morse, Banks and Banking 6th Ed. 1001;
7 Zollman, Banks and Banking and the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Restitution. No different doctrine is announced in the cited cases. The plaintiff
did not make a mistake as to the amount of credit in the
Parsley corporation account when it paid the checks. The
mistake the plaintiff did make was in relying on the promises of the offi,cers and agents of the defendant corporation that the sight drafts which it held would be paid.
On page 30 of appellants' brief, it is said that it was
hot in good taste for the respondent to charge in its plead-
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ings that the appellant or its agents were guilty of fraud
in connection with the transactions here brought in question. In light of these facts: that on January 7, 1953, at
10:00 o'clock A.M. Mr. Nichols and Mr. Sperry appeared
at plaintiff's hank at Provo and assured it the drafts in
process of clearance would be paid (Tr. 54); that on the
same day at about 4:30 P.M. Mr. Wilkinson showed up at
the plaintiff bank and stated to Mr. Bird that he had noticed a number of drafts, meaning the drafts in question,
at the office in Salt Lake and that he ordered the same paid
(Tr. 176-7), and that on the next day, Mr. McElhany showed
up at the bank with about 22 or 23 thousand dollars worth
of ehecks and demanded that the same be paid, and upon
payment being refused, he inquired if the bank knew what
would happen to the drafts which defendant company held
if the checks presented by Mr. McElhany were not paid,
and then left the bank and called up Mr. Wilkinson and directed the drafts be returned to the bank. Then having
directed that the drafts be not paid, again returned to the
plaintiff bank and demanded payment of the checks, we confess that we know of no language that more accurately
characterized defendants' actions than that contained in
plaintiffs' pleadings filed herein.
We quote the following from some of the authorities
·cited by appellants:
"The general rule is that money paid under a mistake of fact may be recovered, but a mistake in regard
to the amount of a customer's deposit is not such a mistake of fact as entitles a bank paying a check to recover back the amount from the payee." Mi-chie on
Bank and Banking, Vlol 5a, page 546, See also the same
Volume Sec. 230.
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In 70 C.J.S., page 371, the law is thus stated:

"It is generally held that the failure of the payor
to exercise ordinary care to avoid the mistake under
whi ch he made the payment sought to be recovered will
nat, as a matter of law, defeat his recovery and that
negligence of the payor in failing to discoveP the facts
will not prevent recovery when the payment was actually made under a mistake of fact unless the payee
has changed his position in reliance on the payment."
1

Citation of a few of the cases will show the trend of
judicial authority:
In the case of
.,. Aebli v. Board of Education of City and
County of San Francisco, 145 Pac. (2d) 501; 62 Cal . .App.
(2d) 706, it is held that if money is paid by mistake of fact,
it may be recovered back no matter how negligent the party
making the payment may have been unless the payment has
caused such change in position of the other party that it
._
would be unjust to require him to refund.
In the ease of Smith v. Rubel, 13 Pac. (2d) 1078; 140
Ore. 42.2, it is held that:
"Generally payment under mistake of fact which
induces erroneous belief that payee is entitled to money
may be recovered provided change in position does not
make recovery inequitable. Payor's negligence will not
defeat recovery in action for money had and received,
absent ·change of condition making recovery inequitable."
The foregoing doctrine is approved by this Court in the
case of Riskey v. Clark, 11 Utah 467; 40 Pac. 717.
By directing the attention of the Court to the effect
of negligence, we do not wish to be understood as conceding that the plaintiff or its agents were negligent in this
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case, especially in light of the fact that the agents and officers of the defendant corporation assured the plaintiff's
officers that the drafts would be paid and that at a time
when, except for such assurances, the checks would not
have been paid.
POINT SIX
THE OBLIGATION DUE THE RESPONDENT BY
THE APPELLANTS WAS NOT PAID OR DISCHARGED
UPON THE EXECUTION OF THE PARSLEY MORTGAGE TO RESPONDENT.

The law is well settled that the taking of a note and
mortgage does not constitute a payment of an obligation
in the absence of an agreement to that effect. 40 Am. Jur.
page 775·, Sec. 87. In this case the evidence is all to the
efifect that the note and mortgage together with an assignment of the accounts receivable were taken to prevent the
dissipation of the assets of the Parsley eorporation and to
protect the bank and other ·creditors (Tr. 62. The trial
court so held. R. 70). Moreover the defendant, by assisting in throwing the Parsley corporation into bankruptcy,
saw to it that the plaintiff can not receive the money owing to it from any money that may be secured from the
payment of the note and mortgage or the accounts receivable assigned to the plaintiff for collection.
It is, of course, the well settled law that the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy is an assertion of the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court over all the property and assets of the
alleged bankrupt with a view to the determination of his
status and the settlement and distribution of his estate in
event an adjudication results.
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Stratton v. New 283 U. S. 318; 75 L. Ed. 1060; Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Tramley, 260 N.Y. 280; 183 N.E.
425; In re Mitchell, 38 F (2d) 283. So also does the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy operate to bring bank accounts
owing to the alleged bankrupt within the legal custody and
control of the bankruptcy court. In re Zemmern1an, 66 F
(2d) 397.
In this case the defendant corporation seeks to enri·ch

itself to the extent of $21,413.08 and then in an effort to
forestall the plaintiff from recovery of its loss by means of
having the Parsley co:vporation declared a bankrupt. To
conclude that such a process constitutes a payment of an
obligation is wholly without support in law or equity.
POINT SEVEN
THE RESPO~NDENT HAS NOT, BY TAKING THE
NOTE AND MORTGAGE, ELE·CTED TO FORE.GO ITS
RIGHTS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION.
Much of what has been said under Point Six is applicable

to Point Seven. It is a matter of common procedure for
one who has a several cause of action against two or more
persons to proceed against them in separate proceedings.
Indeed the fact that an action is several means that separa te actions or proceedings may be brought against them.
The Parsley corporation was not a party to the agreement
whereby the defendant ~corporation agreed to pay the sight
drafts here involved if the plaintiff would pay the checks
which had been presented by defendant corporation for·payment. That was the sole undertaking of the defendant corporation. .The mere fact that plaintiff sought to collect
the ~money from the Parsley corporation does not relieve the
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defendant from its obligation. Of eourse, if the plaintiff
had succeeded in collecting the money owing to it from the
Parsley corporation, it could not again collect from the defendant corporation. Contrary to the statement of counsel
for the defendant on page 37 of its brief, plaintiff has not
collected one cent on the note and mortgage, and if it had
such money, it would be subject to the control and disposition of the bankruptcy court. The fact that appellant was
or was not a surety of Parsley would not change the results.
See U.C.A. 1953, 15-4-2, 15-4-3 and 15-4-4.
It would be a strange doctrine to hold that the defendant corporation is relieved from its obligation to pay because the plaintiff took a note and mortgage from the Parsley corporation which was rendered uncollectable by reason of the defendant corporation succeeding in having the
Parsley corporation thrown into bankruptcy.
POINT ONE A
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING THAT
PART OF ITS CON·CLUSlON OF LAW NO. 1 WHE·RE
IT CONCLUDED THAT THE AMOUNT O~F THE FOUR
DRAFTS IN THE SUM OF $3554.27 SHOULD BE DEDUCTED FROM THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT
TO WHICH THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED AND IN
FAILING TO ENTER J,UDGMENT IN FAV10R OF THE
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION FOR THE SUM OF $21,431.08, TOGETHER
Wl'I'Hj INTEREST THERE0 N AT THE RATE o~F 6%
PER ANNUM FROM AND AFTER JANUARY 8, 1953.
1

The plaintiff has cross-appealed from a part of the
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judgment rendered in this cause. The trial court found in
its Finding numbered 23 (R. 72):
"That as a proximate and direct result of the failure of the defendant corporation to pay the above mentioned drafts, the plaintiff has sustained a loss of $21,431.08, together with interest thereon from and after
January 8, 1953., at 6% per annum."
. The evidence is all to the effect that such loss was sustained by the plaintiff. Notwithstanding the findings and
evidence establish that such loss was sustained, the court
deducted therefrom the sum of $3554.27, that being the
amount of four sight drafts. These sight drafts represented transactions which were accompariied by contracts for
th~ sale -of four automobiles to the purchaser of the same.
T~e defendant corporation concedes. these were retail transactions and that ·as such it was obliated to pay the drafts.
It did not do so, and as a result the plaintiff is out that sum
of money. Defendant corporation seems to contend that
it is not obligated to pay that amount because the plaintiff
conveyed its interest in the contracts for the sale of the
automobiles to the Parsley corporation and took a note and
mortgage from the Parsley ·corporation, which note and
mortgage included the value of the contracts for the sale
of the four .automobiles. Defendant corporation also seems
to contend that because it secured the contracts for the sale
of the four automobiles from the· Parsley corporation and
credited its account with the· same, that therefore, the defendant corporation should be relieved from paying its obligation to the ·plaintiff. · The court should not have any difficulrty in di~sposing of· this latter eontention. ·Obviously the
defendant· corporation could not pay off its· obligation to the
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plaintiff by a transaction had with the Parsley corporation
to which the plaintiff was not a party, and so far as appears
was without knowledge that such a transaction was had.
It may be that the trial court believed that the plaintiff
could recover the $3554.27 in the bankruptcy proceedings
because the plaintiff acquired no preference as to thart
amount ~because the estate of the bankrupt was increased
in that amount by surrender of the contracts for the sale of
the automobiles. It may or may nort be that the $3554.27
can be recovered in the bankruptcy proceeding. The record is silent as to the amount that is owing by the Parsley
corporation, or the amount of the assets that may be required to satisfy preferred claims. Be that as it may, even
if there will be sufficient funds available to pay the $3-554.27
to the plaintiff, such fact does not relieve the defendant corporation from i~ts obligations. As we have heretofore pointed out in this brief, the plaintiff may pursue its claim separately against all who are liable for the payment of the
loss of $21,431.08, which it sustained by reason of the transactions here involved. When and only when the plaintiff
is actually paid all or part of its loss is any party liable
for the payment thereof released from its obligation to pay
the same, and then only to the extent of the amount so
paid. It is so provided by U.C.A. 1953, 15-4-2 and 15-4-3.
This latter section is construed in the case of ·Green v. Lang
Co., 206 Pac (2d) 626.
If a judgment had been obtained against the Parsley
corporation for plaintiff's claim, such fact would not under
the expressed language of U.C.A. 1953, 15-4-2, have discharged the defendant herein. That being so, one of the
steps taken to accomplish such a result would not relieve
the defendant corporation to pay the full amount of dam-
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ages sustained by the plaintiff. It is submitted that plaintiff is entitled . to a judgment for the amount of its loss,
namely, $21,413.08,. togethe·r with interest on $19,646.64
and costs incurred in the trial court in the sum of $29.40 at
8% per annum from and after August 31, 1954, the date of
the judgment, and for the additional sum of $3554.27, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum
from and after January 8, 1953, and for .costs incurred on
this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
J. RULON MO~RGAN
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
and Cross-appellant
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